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Stability of cooperation under 
image scoring in group interactions
Heinrich H. Nax1, Matjaž Perc2,3, Attila Szolnoki4 & Dirk Helbing5,6
Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner’s dilemma through indirect 
reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. 
Many real-world dilemma situations, however, firstly, take place in groups and, secondly, lack the 
necessary transparency to inform subjects reliably of others’ individual past actions. Instead, there 
is revelation of information regarding groups, which allows for ‘group scoring’ but not for image 
scoring. Here, we study how sensitive the positive results related to image scoring are to information 
based on group scoring. We combine analytic results and computer simulations to specify the 
conditions for the emergence of cooperation. We show that under pure group scoring, that is, under 
the complete absence of image-scoring information, cooperation is unsustainable. Away from this 
extreme case, however, the necessary degree of image scoring relative to group scoring depends on 
the population size and is generally very small. We thus conclude that the positive results based on 
image scoring apply to a much broader range of informational settings that are relevant in the real 
world than previously assumed.
Public goods provision1,2, common-pool resource management3, and other social dilemma situations 
often require large groups of individuals to make individually costly contributions toward a collec-
tive action, i.e., to cooperate4. Without sufficient consideration of future consequences, however, many 
real-world interactions lack the necessary cooperativeness to prevent misalignment of private and social 
interests. This leads to socially undesirable outcomes. The result may be irrevocable mismanagement and 
over-exhaustion of shared resources, ultimately resulting in the ‘tragedy of the commons’3,5,6, which is a 
long-term outcome that is worse for everyone.
Hence, the ‘puzzle of cooperation’7–11. Why do certain social interactions flourish with high levels 
of foresight and cooperation, while others are impeded by short-sighted free-riding behaviour? Game 
theory12,13 provides the necessary theoretical framework for studying the individual-level motivations14 to 
answer this question. Indeed, game theory provides many answers, including a variety of evolutionary15,16 
and psychological17–19 explanations, but only two based, in the language of game theory, on ‘rationality’.
One of these two rational explanations is based on foresightedness. Namely, if individuals take 
future consequences sufficiently into account, then equilibria exist supported by more sophisticated, 
repeated-game strategies that overcome the short-term incentives to free-ride20. Unfortunately, to 
uphold cooperation that way, individuals would need to commit to strategies in ways that may produce 
grim consequences if not everyone follows the strategy equilibrium path21. Hence, groups consisting 
of sufficiently foresighted agents may succeed to guarantee provision of a common, while groups with 
too many short-sighted or boundedly rational agents will fail. The second rational explanation of the 
puzzle of cooperation is based on building a reputation from the past22. Essentially, players build a 
commitment-to-cooperation reputation through their past actions, and find each other, thus, outper-
forming defectors (who are stuck with other defectors), even though defection is the uniquely dominant 
1Department of Social Sciences, ETH Zürich, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland. 2Department of Physics, Faculty of 
Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 3Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, 
University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia. 4Institute of Technical Physics and Materials 
Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary. 
5Computational Social Science, ETH Zürich, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland. 6Risk Center, ETH Zürich, 8092 Zürich, 
Switzerland. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to H.H.N. (email: hnax@ethz.ch)
Received: 03 June 2015
Accepted: 18 June 2015
Published: 15 July 2015
OPEN
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
2Scientific RepoRts | 5:12145 | DOi: 10.1038/srep12145
selfish behaviour in the one-shot game14. As a result, if reputation matters sufficiently in determining 
with whom individuals interact, then cooperation can survive despite limited foresight.
Unfortunately, due to the inherent simultaneity of interactions23, it is impossible to condition one’s 
own decision on the decisions of the others14. One of the most important, and perhaps the simplest, 
reputation mechanism known in the literature to overcome this problem is image scoring24. Famously, 
image scoring can sustain cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner’s dilemma through various 
forms of indirect reciprocity25–27. Under image scoring, agents learn who cooperated and who defected 
in previous interactions, and consequently condition their own actions on this information. Essentially, 
image scoring enables cooperators to find each other, and this overcomes the negative Nash equilibrium 
prediction of universal defection from the one-shot game. Interestingly, image scoring has been shown 
to work in the laboratory28–32, but in general, it is considered to provide a relatively frail support to 
cooperative behaviour33,34.
In fact, many real-world social dilemmas unfold in groups35, and it is unlikely that individuals will 
have access to others’ individual action histories1,2. Information that should be readily available, however, 
concerns the performance of the groups as a whole. Such information thus enables ‘group scoring’ as an 
alternative to image scoring. In particular, the image of an individual is no longer determined by its own 
past action, but by the performance of the group where an individual is member. More precisely, each 
player’s group score summarizes the aggregate cooperativeness of the groups where he was a member in 
the past, without any additional information regarding what the player did individually. Two important 
and previously unaddressed new questions emerge: (i) How do results related to image scoring generalize 
to group scoring?, and (ii) How sensitive are these results to information, that is, when image scoring 
constitutes a proportion p ∈ [0,1] of information made available and the residual information is based 
on group scoring? The common feature of previous research on image scoring is that, over time, coop-
erators achieve higher scores and defectors achieve lower scores, and interactions are matched based 
on these scores such that thus cooperators play with cooperators and defectors play with defectors. In 
our paper, we build on this common feature by assuming the existence of a mechanism that assorts 
and matches players by their scores. In addition, we extent the scope of image-scoring-based models 
by analysing the sensitivity of the results to the imperfections of scores that ought to reflect individuals’ 
true past cooperativeness rather than the overall performance of the groups where they are members. 
Our analysis continuously spans the worlds of two extremes; image scoring and group scoring. As we 
will show, image scoring, reflecting accurately individuals’ past actions, works perfectly also in the gen-
eralized prisoner’s dilemma game that is governed by group interaction. Conversely, group scoring fails, 
as it enables defectors to effectively hide behind the cooperative efforts of others in the group. But how 
many true images are needed for cooperation to evolve in group interaction? In other words, what is the 
necessary proportion p ∈ (0,1) of image scoring? It turns out that this depends sensitively on the under-
lying parameters of the interactions in ways that provide a formal basis for some of Ostrom’s conditions 
for successful common-pool resource management3. Key determinants are the rate of return, the size of 
the population, and the group size. Remarkably, for large populations only a ‘grain’ of image scoring is 
generally sufficient for cooperation to become dominant.
Results
We shall now formalize our arguments, generalizing step by step the two-by-two prisoner’s dilemma 
model due to24 to the more general context of the voluntary contributions game1,2. Suppose a population 
N n{1 2 }= , , …,  plays the following game in rounds t {1 2 }= , , …, ∞ . Each player i ∈ N, in period t, 
chooses a contribution ci
t from budget B = {0, 1}. At the same time, each player i is associated with a 
binary score s {0 1}i
t = , , and players are matched into k groups S S{ }k1 = , …,  of a fixed size s = n/k 
according to the ranking of players’ scores (with random tie-breaking). After groups have formed, i’s 







t , where Si
t is i’s group. r is the game’s fixed 
rate of return, and r/s the game’s ‘marginal per-capita rate of return’ that summarizes the underlying 
game’s synergy. We assume, as is standard, r ∈ [1, s], that is, contributing a unit of budget is socially 
beneficial (yielding a sum total of payoffs to all players larger than one), but individually costly.
We consider the following range of scoring mechanisms between image scoring and group scoring.
Image scoring. First, we formulate the equivalent of image scoring24 in our setup: at time t each player 
i has an image score, sIi
t , known to every player which is based on decisions prior to t. In period t + 1, if 
i’s period-t contribution ci
t exceeded the average contribution c c nt i N i
t= ∑ /∈  at time t, then his image 
score is one; if c ci
t t<  then it is zero. Finally, if c ci




Group scoring. Analogously, we formulate group scoring: at time t each player i has a group score, sGi
t . 
Suppose i’s period-t group is S. If the contribution in S, c cS
t
i S i
t= ∑ ∈ , exceeded the average group con-
tribution overall, c c kS
t
S S
tt= ∑ /∈ , then i’s period-(t + 1) group score is one; if c cS
t
S
t<  then it is zero. 
Finally, if c cS
t
S
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Hybrid scoring. A hybrid between image scoring and group scoring in our setup means that, at time 
t, each player i has a hybrid score, sHi
t , known to every player which is based on decisions prior to t. In 
period t + 1, if i’s score is updated according to image scoring with probability p, and according to group 
scoring with probability 1 − p.
To summarize the three scoring methods, the types of information necessary under the different 
regimes are as follows. For image scoring, ex post individual-level information about contribution deci-
sions is necessary, group-level information is therefore trivially also available. For group scoring, group 
associations and ex post group-level contributions need be known, individual-level information is not 
necessary. For the hybrid case, characterized by degree of image scoring p ∈ [0, 1], the probability that 
individual-level information rather than only group-level information becomes available must be larger 
than zero.
The stability of cooperation under the different scoring rules can be evaluated. One result is that 
tragedy of the commons (resulting from universal defection) is a potential risk in all cases. The stability 
of universal defection under all scoring rules derives from the fact that unilateral defection is a best 
response under all scoring methods against a state of universal defection. However, the relative stability 
of this worst-case outcome vis-a-vis a highly cooperative state critically depends on the scoring rule, 
mitigating this issue.
Under image scoring, high levels of cooperation can be stabilized and then turn out to be more stable. 
This is the case if the proportion of cooperators with score one (matched in good groups) grows exactly 
at the speed so as to neutralize the shrinking of the proportion of cooperators with score zero (matched 
in bad groups). The defectors profit from the contributions of the latter group and achieve an average 
growth equal to that of the average cooperator.
Stability is summarized with the results presented in Fig.  1 from simulations. The Methods section 
contains analytical proof of these results, as well as a description of the employed Monte Carlo simula-
tion procedure. It can be observed that the state of complete cooperation is reached exponentially fast. 
We emphasize that this result is recovered independently of the value of s, r and n, and it is also robust 
against variations of the strategy adoption rule. Cooperation will always prevail under image scoring, as 
it allows cooperators to separate from defectors. In general, cooperators form homogeneous groups that 
provide them with a competitive payoff. Conversely, defectors must be content to form groups with their 
like, which provides them a null payoff. Cooperators can therefore easily invade defectors, and they do 
so with a speed that is proportional to their number, which ultimately gives rise to the exponentially fast 
downfall of defectors.
At first sight, such a state of cooperation may also seem a candidate for stability under group scoring. 
Inspection of the individual growth dynamics, however, reveals one crucial difference. Namely, cooper-
ation states are not robust against the influx of defectors with score one. These players outperform all 
others, which, jointly with the fact that score-zero defectors outperform score-zero cooperators, implies 
an above-average growth rate for defection vis-a-vis cooperation. In other words, the key difference 
between image scoring and group scoring is that defectors can only free-ride on the contributions of 
others under image scoring, while, under group scoring, defectors can free-ride on the contributions 
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Figure 1. Under image scoring cooperators always rise to complete dominance. Shown is the fraction 
of cooperators in dependence on the number of iterations. The inset shows the corresponding fraction of 
defectors on a semi-logarithmic scale to highlight their exponential decay. Depicted results are averaged over 
200 independent realizations to minimize fluctuations. Parameter values are: s = 5, n = 1500 and r = 4.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Figure  2 mirrors the set-up of Fig.  1 in terms of the simulation procedure, only that here group 
scoring instead of image scoring is used. It can be observed that, irrespective of the initial fraction of 
cooperators, they eventually die out. As by image scoring, this outcome too is robust against variations 
of s, r, n and the strategy adoption rule. Group scoring allows defectors to have the same high score as 
cooperators, which in turn disables the separation of the two strategies into homogeneous groups. In 
agreement with the outcome of the public goods game in a well-mixed population, even a single defector 
can therefore eventually invade the entire population. Groups scoring thus completely fails to mitigate 
the tragedy of the commons.
Since image scoring and group scoring could not be more different in their ability to stabilize coopera-
tion, it remains of interest to determine the merit of hybrid scoring. While it seems reasonable to assume 
that sometimes the information about the past of each particular individual is readily available, more 
often that not the scoring of an individual is possible only indirectly through the achievements of the 
groups where s/he was member. We note that individual contributions in group efforts are notoriously 
difficult to pinpoint, which is also why the reciprocation to such efforts is quite a vague concept — if a 
group contains a cooperator and a defector, who do you reciprocate with36? The question thus is, just 
how much individual-level information is needed to stabilize cooperation? To answer this question, we 
introduce the probability p that a player’s score is determined by image scoring, while otherwise, with 
probability 1 − p, group scoring is used. All other simulation details remain the same as in Figs 1 and 2.
Results presented in Fig. 3 show that cooperation can evolve even at a very small p value, if only the 
population size is sufficiently large. The key for the stability of cooperation is for cooperators being able 
to recognize each other through their high scores, and thus to form homogeneous groups. The lower the 
value of p and the lower the value of r, the longer it takes for cooperators to segregate from defectors. 
Since cooperators are threatened by extinction, it is imperative that the segregation occurs before defec-
tors take over. Accordingly, the lower the value of p and r, the larger the population size needs to be to 
warrant sufficient time to cooperators to segregate before they die out. A lower bound for p is p ≥ 2/n. 
Results presented in Fig. 4 make these arguments quantitatively more accurate. Evidently, the lower the 
population size, the higher the values of p and r need to be for cooperation to prevail. In small popula-
tions, there exist critical threshold values for both r (main panel) and r (inset), where drops to defector 
dominance are abrupt and occurring without precursors.
We emphasize that the results concerning hybrid scoring mechanisms are independent of the group 
size as long as their number, and hence the population size, is sufficiently large, and they are also inde-
pendent of the strategy adoption rule. This corroborates our main argument, which is that, regardless 
of the scoring that is used, conditions need to be given for cooperators to completely segregate from 
defectors, i.e., to form homogeneous groups without a single defector. The identification of defectors has 
second-order importance. The key goal of scoring is thus to allow cooperators to recognize each other 
efficiently and to form homogenous groups accordingly.
Discussion
“The most important unanswered question in evolutionary biology, and more generally in the social 
sciences, is how cooperative behaviour evolved and can be maintained in human or other animal 












Figure 2. Under group scoring cooperators always die out. Shown is the fraction of cooperators in 
dependence on the number of iterations for two different initial fractions (see legend). Depicted results are 
averaged over 200 independent realizations to minimize fluctuations. Parameter values are the same as in 
Fig. 1.
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explanation for the puzzle of cooperation is based on image scoring24, a mechanism that is both stun-
ningly successful and stunningly simple. However, in its original formulation and application24, it came 
with the restriction to interactions that are pairwise to informational environments that allow a complete 
tracking of individual-level information.
In the real world, these restrictive assumptions may not be germane. Instead, cooperation may involve 
several groups of individuals, and ex post information regarding individual-level cooperativeness may 
only percolate imperfectly through group-level information. Our focus in this paper has been to determine 
robust theoretical predictions regarding the emergence and survival of cooperation in such situations. 
The presented results have rather important implications. One is negative. Namely, when individual-level 
information is not available, cooperation cannot spread. But there is a silver lining. When there is at least 
a ‘grain’ of individual-level information, this may suffice for cooperators to find each other and form 
groups that are impervious to an invasion by defectors. We have shown that the spread of cooperation is 
robust to extensive imperfections in image scoring, thus extending the domain of environments where 
we should expect flourishing cooperation levels based on this established mechanism that fosters indirect 
reciprocity. Factors that affect the effectiveness of hybrid scoring negatively and positively are group size 
and population size, respectively. The rate of return was shown to not matter.
There is one important component that the model we considered here externalises, namely the issue 
of how a hierarchy of scores translates into an analogous group formation hierarchy. These are questions 
future work should address. In particular, we need to address how mechanisms known to play such a role 
in the context of image scoring would translate into the informational setting considered here, and how 
such mechanisms may be designed. Little is known in this direction. Economic experiments37,38 might 
be particularly conductive to such research and guide future theoretical work to relevantly address these 
fundamental dilemmas of human cooperation.
Methods
Simulation procedure. The employed Monte Carlo simulation procedure39 requires the iteration of 
the following three elementary steps. First, two randomly selected players i and j play one instance 
of the public goods game in their current group, thereby obtaining payoffs φi and φj, respectively. 
Next, player j adopts the strategy of player i with the probability given by the Fermi function W = 1/
{1 + exp[(φj − φi)/K]}, where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions40. Each full Monte 
Carlo step gives a chance for every player to change its strategy once on average. The reported fractions 
of cooperators and defectors were determined in the stationary state.
Stability analysis. At a given time t, there are four action-score pairs: cooperate-one c s 1i
t
i
t( = = ), 
defect-one (c 0i
t =  and s 1i
t = ), cooperate-zero (c 1i
t =  and s 0i
t = ), and defect-zero c s 0i
t
i
t( = = ). 
Suppose players are hardwired to play either action. However, scores change. Depending on the scoring 
















Figure 3. Under hybrid scoring, even a minute probability for accessing the image score of an individual 
player suffices to stabilize cooperation. However, the size of the population is crucial, as the segregation 
of cooperators from defectors takes the longer the smaller the value of p. Thus, if the population size is too 
small, cooperators are likely to die out before segregating into homogeneous groups. Segregation is also 
decelerated by low values r (see Fig. 4 for details). Shown is the fraction of cooperators in dependence on 
the number of iterations, as obtained for different numbers of groups forming the population (indicated 
alongside the lines). Depicted results are averaged over 50–200 independent realizations to minimize 
fluctuations. Parameter values are: p = 0.01, s = 5 and r = 1.1.
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period t + 1. Assume that in some period all four action-score pairs are represented by positive popula-
tion proportions, pC1, pD1, pC0, pD0. Write pC, pD for the proportions of cooperators and defectors. Suppose 
the action proportions grow/ shrink, for action a = {C, D}, given by a replicator equation similar to that 




a1 1 0 0 , where πas is the expected payoff 
to action-score pair as and π is the average population payoff.
Stability of unconditional defection under all scoring rules. Suppose all players j in period t, inde-
pendent of their score, defect except for one player i who plays c 1i
t = . W.l.o.g., suppose s 1i
t = . No 
matter what i’s score, the payoff to i representing pC1 is πC1 = r/s < 1, while the average payoff is 
r s1 0sn
1
1π = + ( / ) >
−
−
. Hence, ∂pC/∂t < 0 and therefore any such process is stable at pC = 0.
Stability of high cooperation levels under image scoring. Suppose the four different strategies at 
time t have mass of pC1, pD1, pC0, pD0 respectively such that pD1 = 0. We shall now show that there exists 
a starting state with pC > (s − 1)/s such that ∂pC/∂t = 0. Suppose that pC1 = (n − s)/n. 
Then πC1 = r, πC0 = (s − n * pD0) * (r/s) and πD0 = 1 + (s − n * pD0) * (r/s). ∂pC/∂t = 0 if 
( )∗ + ∗ ( − ∗ ) ∗ ( / ) = ∗ + ( − ∗ ) ∗ ( / )− − ⁎r s n p r s p s n p r s1n sn
s n p
n D D D0 0 0
D0 . This 
yields = /( − + ∗ ( / ))p r n r s1 1DO . Hence, a high cooperation level of =
∗ ( / ) −
− + ∗ ( / )
pC
n r s r
r n r s1
 is sta-
ble if pC1 = (n − s)/n, pD1 = 0, = ( / ) − /( − + ∗ ( / ))p s n r n r s1 1C0 , and 
= /( − + ∗ ( / ))p r n r s1 1DO . Notice that the temporary growth in pC1 relative to pC0 is compen-
sated by the score dynamics which imply that exactly the proportion by which pC0 will be replaced by 
the growth in pC1. Notice also that these proportions are robust to a small increase in pD1 = 0 as the 
overproportional growth of D1 will result in scores of zero in the next period (all D1s will turn D0 in 
the next round), and then lead to a shrinking of D0.
Instability of high cooperation levels under group scoring. At first sight, the state with pC1 = (n − s)/n, 
pD1 = 0, = ( / ) − /( − + ∗ ( / ))p s n r n r s1 1C0 , and = /( − + ∗ ( / ))p r n r s1 1DO  could be sta-
ble. Indeed, provided that pD1 = 0 this state is stable against growth of proportions pC1, pC0 and pDO. 
However, any small increase in pD1 destabilizes the whole system. This is because, given pC1, pC0 and pDO, 
the non-zero proportion pD1 not only grows overproportional, but also — and this is the key difference 
with image scoring-- is likely to keep a score of one, and will therefore also not shrink in the next period. 
Hence, the growth of C1 slows down while D1 keeps growing. There can be no stable state with a positive 
proportion pD1 as both pD1 and pD0 would continue to grow faster than their cooperation counterparts.
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